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Abstract
The public sector supplies a club good ﬁnanced by either a head tax or proportional taxation on exogenous
incomes in a democracy. For a class of utility functions and club quality functions, the optimal club quality
is independent of the income distribution, and hence of the identity of the median voter. With ”uniform
and universal” public provision , the median voter chooses the head tax or proportional tax rate. This can
result in lower levels of club goods in either ﬁnancing regime than would occur in the ﬁrst best. However,
provision in all the latter three regimes can be lower than would occur via market supply by a ”not for
proﬁt” organisation.
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Is the public sector too large in a democracy? This paper studies the democratic determination
of the size of a public sector supplying a congestible and excludable shared good - a Buchanan
(1965) club good - like healthcare or education. Such goods seem more prevalent than Samuelson
pure public goods. Our simple model of direct democracy has consumer-voters dierentiated only
by their exogenous incomes. They get utility from a club good and a numeraire private good.
With public sector provision, the club is ﬁnanced by a head tax or a proportional income tax. In a
democracy, these tax parameters are set by the median voter (MV). We show that, with ”uniform
and universal” public provision [cf. Besley and Coate (1991)] in a democracy, then, relative to the
ﬁrst best (FB), there can be underprovision of the club good in either tax regime. I.e., the public
sector can be too small in a democracy. All of these three regimes can lead to less provision of
the club good than occurs via a market supplied by break-even ”not for proﬁt” organisations.
Additionally, our model explains two empirical puzzles. First, why is municipal spending not
always related to the median income in a polity? Second, why are there often no scale eects in
providing shared goods - suggesting that such goods might be essentially private?
A classic source of the claim that the public sector is too large in a democracy is Meltzer
and Richard (1981). They sought to explain how an expansion in surage and a reduction in
median income relative to the mean might result in an expansion of the state. But, they focused
on a government which engaged solely in the redistribution of (endogenous) incomes1 . Earlier,
Bowen (1943) had studied the provision of a pure public good ﬁnanced by uniform taxation of
exogenous incomes. He argued that the MV determination of its level might be ine!cient relative
t oa” s e c o n db e s t ”( S B ) .T h eS Bs a t i s ﬁes the well known ”Samuelson rule”. There is ine!ciency
if the MV’s marginal valuation of the public good diers from the mean marginal valuation in the
0 Myrna Wooders’ comments on related work that improved this paper. Seminar participants at
the Universities of Keele and Leicester and in Birmingham University’s Economic Theory Conference
in July 2003, especially Frank Milne and Marco Ottovani, also made helpful suggestions.
1 Peltzman (1980) also focused on a government exclusively concerned with redistribution.
1population and/or his tax price diers from the mean tax price.
Many later contributors also noted that a sizeable part of the public budget goes to providing
shared goods2 . Then [cf., e.g., Mueller (2003, 516)], tax-induced direct transfers of incomes alone
8
a la Meltzer-Richard are unnecessary for redistribution. Redistribution is achievable by supplying
shared goods with progressivity in the tax system. Several authors have reﬁned this insight under
a variety of electoral arrangements [Lizzeri and Persico (2001) being among the latest]. But
attention has been conﬁned to public goods. Arguably, club goods like garbage collection and the
ﬁre service are of at least equal economic signiﬁcance to the few examples of pure public goods
(e.g., clean air) which one can ﬁnd. This partly explains our concentration on them.
Our other reason for focusing on club goods is twofold. First, excludability enables them to be
provided in either the public or private sector. So, it is of interest to compare public and private
provision, as the private sector might ameliorate any ine!ciency in public provision3 . Second, due
to congestibility, there are quantity and quality dimensions to clubs. In the best of circumstances,
this makes their analysis more involved than for a pure public good, for which quality and quantity
are synonymous. For a start, it is not obvious which of two situations has a larger public sector
if one has a larger quantity of the club good, but a greater intensity of use results in a lower
quality of it as compared with the other. E.g., the public sector might provide more hospitals in
one situation than another. But, if a larger throughput of patients in the ﬁrst situation results in
them receiving poorer care, on average, than in the second, it is unclear that the ﬁrst situation has
a larger public sector. A quality-adjusted notion of size might be appropriate. With democratic
provision, there is also the di!culty that the Median Voter Theorem (MVT) does not apply to
multidimensional choice problems, except in special cases4 .
2 See, e.g., Mueller and Murrell (1985) and Mueller’s survey (2003, ch 21).
3 But, unlike some analyses of public provision of private goods (e.g., cf. Besley and Coate, 1991), we treat
private sector and public sector provison of shared goods as mutually exclusive and exhaustive. I.e., we do not
allow some consumers to either augment public provision or substitute a higher quality private sector alternative.
If the public sector exists, then the private sector does not.
4 Perhaps the most up-to-date survey of the di!culties of obtaining consistency in voting in multidimensional
choice contexts is Mueller (2003, especially chapter 5).
2We build a simple model of the democratic choice of the quality and quantity of a club good that
lets us compare dierent supply regimes. The key is that we focus on the families of preferences
for which there is unanimity regarding the optimal quality of the club good. This achieves two
things. First, it reduces the eective dimension of the MV’s problem. Second, more importantly,
the same quality level is optimal in all the dierent regimes.5 The model then allows a ranking of
provision of a club good by its facility size, the one dimension which then diers when it is supplied
in, respectively: (a) the ﬁr s tb e s t( F B ) ;( b )ad e m o c r a c yw i t hh e a dt a xﬁnancing; (c) a democracy
with proportional taxation; (d) ”not-for-proﬁt” undertakings. If the MV has lower than mean
income, as is reasonable empirically, a democracy might underprovide a club good relative to the
FB. The latter provision will be, in turn, lower than that in either a constrained second best or,
equivalently in our model, a regime with market provision by not-for-proﬁt organisations.
Our analysis also throws up some other surprising ﬁndings: not only might the FB and MV-
determined sizes of the public sector coincide, irrespective of the relative size of the median and
mean incomes, but also the public sector size in the MV equilibrium might depend on mean, but
not median, income. The next section outlines the model. Section 3 considers the ”ﬁrst best”
and Section 4 the democratic provision of the club good. Section 5, turns to a comparison of the
size of the public sector in the dierent provision regimes. Section 6 brieﬂy examines empirical
implications of our analysis while section 7 concludes. An Appendix contains a proof.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a single-club economy for simplicity6 . There are N consumers, all with an identical
utility function, U [.],d e ﬁned over the quantity, x, of a numeraire private commodity, visits to or
5 If everyone has the same preferences, as is often assumed in applied political economy models, Kramer’s (1973)
theorem shows that the MV will be decisive in multidimensional choice contexts. However, this will not be su!cient
to enable us to make a comparison of the club good provision in a democracy with that in other regimes where
both dierent qualities and club facility sizes will generally be chosen.
6 Even the most sophisticated comparisons of pure public good provision across dierent regimes that allow for
many private goods [e.g., Gaube’s (2000) study of the FB and SB] consider only one public good. Whether with
public goods or club goods, aggregation problems would arise once we have more than one such good.
3use of a single club good, v, and its quality, q. The private good is a necessity; the club good is
not and need not be demanded at low incomes. We assume:
(A.1) U is strictly concave increasing in x, concave increasing in v and non-decreasing in q.




have a continuous density, dF(m)
(we ignore integer problems). So, national income is Y =
R
mdF (m). The distribution F (m) is
known to the government or any other club supplier. In the second best, such a supplier cannot
identify the income of any particular individual for tax or price discrimination purposes. In the
ﬁrst best, or the environment with proportional income taxation studied below, we assume that
it can.
(A.3) A club’s quality increases in its facility size, y, and decreases in its aggregate utilisation,
V : Cq(y,V)/Cy  q1 (y,V) > 0; Cq(y,V)/CV  q2 (y,V) < 0
(A.4) (a) q(.) is homogeneous of degree zero in y and V : q(y,V)  q(y/V),q0 > 0;( b )q00 < 0
NB: (i) with exogenous income, there are no incentive eects to providing and ﬁnancing the
club good; (ii) facility size is measured by the expenditure on the club: a unit of money buys a
unit of ”facility”; (iii) If q is of the form (A.4), quality depends solely on the facility provision
per use of the club. Only with this form will the FB ”toll,” if levied, make the club break even,
whatever the population size [Kolm (1974); Mohring and Harwitz (1962)]. Here, the FB ”toll” is
not a price but, rather, club users’ identical marginal willingness to pay for a marginal visit by
foregoing private consumption and equals the value of the quality degradation the marginal visit
imposes on club users; (iv) zero homogeneity of the quality function means that, e.g., the quality
of a pool as perceived by swimmers depends just on the average amount of space each has to swim
in, not on the number of swimmers or the size of the pool independently.
Finally, we restrict attention to the families of utility functions for which optimal quality
provision in the club is independent of the income distribution if (A.4) holds. These families are
identiﬁed in the following theorem, due to [Fraser (2000, 2002b)]:
Theorem 1. If the club quality function satisﬁes (A.4), then the optimal quality provision of
4the club good is independent of the income distribution if and only if all consumers have a utility
function, U(x,v,q), which belongs to a family which satisﬁes the partial dierential equation
vCU/Cv = g(q)CU/Cq, (1)
for some function g(q).
Equation (1) identiﬁes numerous families of utility functions. Examples include U(x,v,q)=
(x,vq),w h e ng(q)=q/, > 0 being a scalar, and U(x,v,q)=[x,exp(q/k)],w h e ng(q)=k,
for some scalar k>0. Such utility functions are precisely ones for which we can talk of the club
good in terms of quality-adjusted or ”e!ciency” units. Fraser (2000) provides a detailed intuitive
justiﬁcation for Theorem 1. He shows that the utility functions which it generates produce very
simple rules for optimal quality provision, such as ”choose that level of investment in quality which
maximises the quality per unit of investment” (i.e., ”maximise the bangs per buck” with respect
to quality). Clearly, the Theorem imposes a stronger restriction than weak separability of (v,q)
from x upon U(x,v,q).
We will only study explicitly perhaps the simplest utility satisfying (1), namely
U(x,v,q)= u(x,vq) (2)
(where  =1above)7 . However, identical considerations to those identiﬁed below will apply to
the analysis of the other cases satisfying (1).
3T h e F i r s t B e s t
In the FB, the government has full information about consumers’ incomes. It can pool resources
to get any allocation of goods, hence welfare, it thinks ﬁt, subject to the economy’s overall endow-
ment. It can be shown that, as everyone has the same U and incomes are exogenous, to maximise
7 Fraser (2000) shows that the ”independence” referred to in Theorem (which he termed a ”partial separation
of e!ciency from distribution”) does not require everyone to have the same utility function. The utility functions
just all need to belong to the same family. E.g., if the population comprises two types with the dierent utility
functions U1 (x,vq) and U2 (x,vq), then the optimal q would be independent of the income distribution.
5aggregate utilitarian welfare the government equalises utilities at the (x,v) bundle that maximises
a single person’s utility with all treated equally.
Let facility provision per use of the club be p - i.e., p  y/V.B y( A . 4 ) ,q = q(p).L e tm  Y/N
denote mean income The FB problem is then:
Max
p,v .u[m  pv,vq(p)] (3)
Using (*) to indicate the FB, the two ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC) characterising it are the com-
plementary slack conditions:
{u1 [m  pv,vq(p)]p + u2 [m  pv,vq(p)]q (p)  0;v  0} (4)
{u1 [m  pv,vq(p)] + u2 [m  pv,vq(p)]q0 (p)  0;p  0} (5)
At an interior solution, the FOCs reduce to
pq0(p)=q (p) (6)
Note that any p which solves (6) depends only on the quality function, q (p), and not on m.
This is just a reiteration of the fact that, with the utility function (2), p is independent of the
distribution of income. If (6) has a unique solution, as we will assume henceforth, it identiﬁes the
unique p. This will also be the unique p for which the quality provision per unit of expenditure
is maximised with the given utility function [Fraser (2000)]. Note additionally from (4) that, if
v =0 ,
u1(m,0)p + u2(m,0)q(p)  0 (7)
If the club good is normal, when (7) holds with equality it identiﬁes a unique mean income, m
say, below which v =0and above which v > 0. In any case, the FB level of facility provision is
then
y = Npv (8)
64 Democratic provision of the club good
We will adopt the standard static approach which assumes that the level of provision of the shared
good in a democracy is that which maximises the MV’s utility. We will consider two alternative
break-even tax-cum-provision regimes in turn. In the ﬁrst, with proportional income taxation,
the MV chooses the proportional tax rate and the level of club good provision, to be supplied
uniformly to all, which maximises its utility. The income tax revenue just ﬁnances the aggregate
provision of the club good. In the second regime, the MV again chooses the uniform club good
provision level and the associated expenditure on the facility, now ﬁnanced by a head tax.. Despite
the multidimensional nature of the MV’s problems in these two environments, we will see that the
population’s unanimity regarding the most desirable level of facility provision per unit use of the
club eectively converts the problem to a unidimensional one8 .
Our analysis applies to, e.g., the democratic determination of the characteristics of a club good
like the non-tertiary (i.e., pre-university) education system. The quality of that education can be
proxied by the number of pupils per teacher (the ”class size”). The quantity of that education per
child is the number of days schooling in the school career. The quantity and quality of education
combine with the number of children to determine the size of the education system. Consequently,
they determine the overall expenditure on it, given the average salary of teachers (taken to be
exogenous). Ignoring minor sources of randomness like illness, class sizes and the number of days
of schooling are completely within the control of the MV in a polity.
4.1 Proportional Taxation
Let  denote a proportional rate of income taxation. With proportional taxation, the MV sets a 
and a club consumption level, v, knowing that the club allocation to everyone is the same. Hence,
aggregate club use would be V = Nv and y = Y is the aggregate level of the facility provision.9
8 It is not unusual for multidimensional choice problems with voting to be reduced to single-dimensional ones.
This was so in Meltzer and Richard’s analysis, which used an explicit utility function. See Roberts (1977) also.
9 In terms of our educational example, y is the education budget.
7By (A.4), the quality of the club good will be given by q(y/V)=q (Y/V)=q (Y/Nv).Av o t e r
with income m would choose v and  to solve:
Max
,v .u[m(1  ),vq(Y/Nv)] (9)
Let p  Y/Nv = m/v denote the level of facility provision per unit use of the club in this
case. Let () again show an optimum. Assuming an interior solution again, the solution to (9)
then satisﬁes
 : mu1 [m(1  ),vq(p)] + u2 [m(1  ),vq(p)]q0(p)(m)=0 (a)
v : u2 [m(1  ),vq(p)][q(p)  pq0(p)] = 0 (b)
(10)
Equation (10)(b) collapses to (6). This conﬁrms that p = p: the optimal quality of the
club good that would be chosen by any voter is independent of income. It also suggests that this
quality is independent of the mode of ﬁnancing the club good. In terms of our education example,
this means that everyone would agree on the optimal class size, although they might disagree on
the right length for the school year or the school career.
If p = p would be chosen by everyone, irrespective of income, including the person with
median income, it follows that everyone’s choice of  and v must satisfy the positive linear rela-
tionship
 =( p/m)v (11)
Hence, a voter’s two-dimensional choice is reduced to a one-dimensional choice of either  or v.
Problem (9) can be rewritten as
Max
 .u[m(1  ),mq(p)/p] (12)
Provided u[m(1  ),mq(p)/p] is single-peaked in , which it will be by concavity, we can
apply the MVT to the determination of  (and hence v) by the MV in the political equilibrium.
Let b m denote the median income. The proportional tax and uniform club provision level, v,
chosen by the MV will satisfy (11), with  =( p/m)v, and hence, from (10)(a),
8b mu1 [b m(1  ),vq(p)] + u2 [b m(1  ),vq(p)]q0(p)(m)=0 (13)
The resulting size of the club facility will be
y = pNv (14)
4.2 A Head Tax
When provision of the club good is ﬁnanced by a head tax, an arbitrary voter would seek to choose
the uniform level of club provision and the level of investment in the club facility per use of the
club, which determines its quality, in order to maximise utility. Let pt be the club facility per unit
use chosen in this case, with q (pt) the corresponding quality. At uniform club provision level v,
this determines the head tax ptv.








By inspection, (15) is identical to the FB problem (3), except that the arbitrary income level m
will generally dier from the mean income, m. It will again generate the FB investment in quality
per unit use of the club good, pt = p, irrespective of the voter’s income. This unanimity means
that the MVT can again be applied. Letting vt be the level of club good provision chosen by the
MV in this case, this satisﬁes
u1
£




b m  pvt,vtq(p)
¤
q (p)=0 (16)
with the resulting level of expenditure on the club facility being given by
yt = pNvt (17)
A comparison of y ,y and yt indicates that their relative size ranking, hence the relative size of
the state in the three instances, is the same as that of v ,v and vt.
95 The Size of the Public Sector in the Dierent Regimes
A comparison of (10)(a) and (17) now leads immediately to our ﬁrst result.
Proposition 1 I ft h ec l u bg o o di sn o r m a la n dm>b m,t h e nv >v t
This result holds for the following reason. Both the FB and the head tax cases involve the
decision-maker eectively ”buying” the club good at a constant per unit price of p.B yt h es a m e
token, the FB corresponds formally to an MV equilibrium with a head tax in which aggregate
income is redistributed so that everyone has mean, and thus median, income. If this mean-cum-
median income is larger than the true median income in the population, and the club good is
normal, then v >v t must follow. In the FB, the fact that a head tax is usually regressive does
not matter, given that everyone has the same income. In the real head tax regime, it does matter.
The lower is median income, the lower will be the head tax and, hence vt.
The above argument suggests that we should expect the size of the state to be larger with
proportional taxation than with the more regressive head tax. This is indeed our next result,
proven in the Appendix, under the following additional assumption:
(A.5) u12  0 (Edgeworth-Pareto complementarity).
Proposition 2 If (A.5) holds and m>b m,t h e nv >v t.
Will the public sector determined by the MV under proportional taxation be larger than
the FB one in our model? There seem to be two principal opposing forces at work. First, by
assumption, the MV has lower income than someone with mean income. As we have seen, the
latter is eectively the decision-maker in the FB. This means that, OTRE, the MV would choose
to pay for a lower level of the club good than would be provided in the FB, provided that the
club good is normal. Second, as  b m/v < m/v = p,t h ee ective unit ”price” for the club
good of quality q (p) that is paid by the MV is less than the real price. However, this real price,
p,d o e sh a v et ob ep a i db yt h ed e c i s i o nm a k e ri nt h eF B .T h i sd i erence in prices means that
there is an income eect and a substitution eect which both work in the direction of making the
10MV paying a proportional tax tend to demand more of the club good than someone of the same
income would demand if faced with the price p10.
Unsurprisingly, in view of the above argument, we have the following result.
Proposition 3 v {>,=,<}v are all possible.
We can prove this result simply by constructing examples to show that v {>,=,<}v are all
possible. More importantly, these examples will highlight how critical magnitudes, such as the
relationship between m and b m and the attitude to risk or inequality, interact in determining the
direction of inequality between v and v, hence between y and y.
Example 1. u(x,vq)=x1/2 +( vq + 1)





m2q2  b m1p2







pq (p)(p + q)
(19)
From these expressions, we can calculate that v
v
;
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A A A A A A >
1.B u t , g i v e n o u r h y -
pothesis that m>b m,w ec o n c l u d et h a tv >v .
Example 2. u(x,vq)=A+vqex, A being some scalar, and q(p)=p1/21. Then: p =4 ,
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A A A A A A >
p/q (p). It is clear that there can be any direction
of inequality between v and v, depending on the speciﬁcs of the quality function q(p) and the
10 Stiglitz (2000, ch. 7) advances similar arguments in the context of pure public goods. He concludes that
public goods will be oversupplied with proportional (or progressive) taxation in an MV equilibrium. His focus is
on oversupply in the sense of the Samuelson rule - where the social marginal valuation of the public good is less
than its social marginal cost. Our focus is on ranking levels of goods in dierent regimes. See Chang (2000) and
Gaube (2000) on the distinction between rankings by rule and by level.
11 Details of the calculations yielding the expressions in these examples are available on request.
11relationship between b m and m, among other things. With the special quality function chosen,





=4=p/q (p) and v = v.I f











=4 .1859304(7d.p.) > 4=p/q (p) and v <v . In this particular example,
we validate the usual presumption that an increase in b m/m makes v <v  more likely. This is
because the price eects noted above are relatively less signiﬁcant. In turn, this is because the
closer in income is the median person to the mean one, the less the former beneﬁts from the
redistribution associated with the proportional tax ﬁnanced uniform provision of the club good.
Example 3. u(x,vq)=x1
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Clearly, if  =1(i.e., when u(x,vq)=l n x + vq),t h e nv = v.A sb m/m<1, by hypothesis,
if  > 1 then (b m/m)
1/ > b m/m,s o(b m/m)
1/ m/b m>1 and v >v , irrespective of the precise
magnitude of b m/m.I f < 1, the conclusion is reversed.
Example 4. u(x,vq)=x (vq + 1)

, for scalars  > 0, > 0.T h e nv =( mq  p1)/( + )qp =
v, irrespective of the relationship between b m and m, among other things.
Examples 1-3 illustrate some of the inﬂuences on v and v, such as the elasticity of marginal
utility w.r.t. private good consumption, which help to determine their relative magnitude in an
intuitive way. Example 4 is perhaps most interesting. This is not only because it has v = v,
irrespective of  and , but also because, surprisingly, v depends on m, but not on b m.A l t h o u g h
this is obviously an artefact of the Cobb-Douglas-cum-Stone-Geary utility speciﬁcation, we have
no a priori basis for concluding that this speciﬁcation is unreasonable and, hence, that we can rule
this out empirically.
Examples 1-4 convey a more general lesson: although the subutility associated with the club
good, vq, and the associated optimal club quality are the same in all four examples, they never-
12theless generate very dierent optimal MV demands for the club good. This is simply because
the underlying preferences over the club and private goods are very dierent in the 4 examples.
In consequence, dierent jurisdictions with, e.g., dierent demographic characteristics and thus
dierent preferences as between the club good and the private good, might demand dierent levels
of the club good, even if they have the same median income and agree on the optimal quality of
that good.
The Second Best
We can use the Fraser-Hollander model of constrained second best clubs [cf.: Fraser and Hol-
lander, Cornes and Sandler (1996), Fraser (2000)] to provide a comparator for the other regimes.
In this model, which builds on the approach of, e.g., Brito and Oakland (1980) and Fraser (1996)
for excludable public goods, atomistic consumers confront a per visit price, facility size and con-
jectured quality for a club good. These latter magnitudes can be regarded as being determined
by a benevolent government, as in the FB. However, unlike in the FB, it is assumed that the
government does not have the information to redistribute incomes directly. Taking these price
and quality for the club good as parametric, consumers self-select to club membership. In any
resulting equilibrium, their simultaneous actions must validate the club congestion, hence quality,
which they conjectured. In turn, the government or any entrepreneurial club good supplier can use
the demand schedule generated by the consumers’ joint actions, which it (correctly) anticipates,
to ﬁx the optimal price and level of facility provision that fulﬁll its objectives. One interpretation
of this model is that it involves market provision of the club good by break-even, ”not for proﬁt”
organisations. Alternatively, we can regard it as representing hypothecated tax-ﬁnanced provision
by a government with limited information on individual consumers’ characteristics. Under the
same assumptions on preferences and the club quality function as before, the SB will generally
involve exclusion and a price for the club good equal to the p identiﬁed previously.
Using this model, al-Nowaihi and Fraser (2003) have shown that, with everyone having the
same class of utility function as used in this paper, the level of club good provision in the SB will
13exceed that in the FB, provided that the demand function for the club good is convex. This will
be the case, e.g., in Examples 1-4 above. If y >y (>y t), as we have argued is quite likely, then
a democracy can lead to too small a public sector while private sector, not for proﬁt, provision
of the same shared goods would be socially excessive. Which leads to the greater welfare loss is
unclear.
6 Empirical Implications
Our analysis enables us to address two empirically puzzling phenomena. The ﬁrst is the common
ﬁnding of either no, or a weak, relationship between median voter income (or median income
relative to mean income) and the size of the public sector. (E.g., cf. Gouveia and Masai, 1998;
Kristov, Lindert and McClelland, 1992, and Mueller’s survey (2003, 243-6). Second is the apparent
absence of a signiﬁcant scale ee c ti nt h ep r o v i s i o no fs h a r e dg o o d s12 . Regarding the ﬁrst, we
have shown that there can be any relationship between the democratic and ﬁrst best provision
levels of a club good. Empirically, perhaps more interesting is the possibility that there can be
any relationship or none (as in Example 4) between the size of the public sector and the median
income in an MV equilibrium.
Regarding the explanation of the presence or absence of congestion eects, we have shown
that congestion eects might apparently be absent if both of two circumstances are met: (i)
congestion/quality functions are homogeneous of degree zero in the facility size and the aggregate
club use, and (ii) agents have preferences which, given (i), result in a separation of e!ciency from
distribution in that the optimal quality of the club good is independent of the median voter’s
income. The same optimal amount will then be spent per unit of the club facility, irrespective
of the facility size, its number of users and the income of the MV. Suppose, e.g., everyone had
the same subutility from the club good in two dierent jurisdictions satisfying (i) and (ii), where
agents within a jurisdiction had identical tastes, but tastes diered between the jurisdictions. We
12 Mueller (2003, 246-7) surveys the empirics on this issue. Reiter and Wiechenrieder (1999) both discuss
theoretical issues in the measurement of quality and comment on the empirical ﬁndings.
14know from Theorem 1 that we would observe an identical quality provision of the club good in
the two jurisdictions. Because of the dierent tastes, MV income and/or populations, we might
observe dierent overall levels of club provision in the two jurisdictions, but at a common and
constant cost per unit of size - as, e.g., in Examples 1-4. Note that neither of (i) or (ii) alone is
su!cient for this outcome. It is a moot point whether the empirical observations on the absence
of scale eects in the cost of providing shared goods in turn provides a justiﬁcation for the utility
and quality speciﬁcations we have employed in this paper.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown that, when the public sector supplies club goods, there might be very little basis
for the widespread belief that the public sector is too large in a democracy. The MV-determined
public sector size might even be independent of median income. Club good provision has quality
and quantity dimensions. So, to allow for comparability between dierent institutional settings,
we focused on cases in which the optimal quality provision was independent of the distribution of
income and, hence, of median income. Therefore, we needed only to rank the quantity of provision
in the dierent environments. As we have argued, such cases are ones which also conform with
another frequent emprical ﬁnding - namely, the absence of scale eects in public sector provision.
While our model was relatively simple, incorporating one club good and one private good,
we would anticipate our results to be robust to at least two possible generalisations. The ﬁrst is
the incorporation of additional club goods, provided each is characterised by a zero homogeneous
quality function, as in (A.4), and enters everyone’s utility identically in the separable fashion
identiﬁed by Theorem 1. In that event, the quality provision, hence ”price”, of each club good
would be independent of distribution. We could therefore deﬁne a Hicksian ”composite” club
good and conduct the analysis as before. The second generalisation incorporates endogenous
labour supply and incomes in a model where consumers dier only in exogenous skill. It can
be shown that Theorem 1 carries over to this environment [cf. Fraser (2002a)]. Consequently,
15with unanimity w.r.t. the optimal quality for a single club good, we could in principle again rank
the ﬁrst-best and democratic club good provision simply according to the respective quantities
provided in the two cases.
A further generalisation which might be worth exploring in subsequent work is consideration
of a model of representative democracy in which the median voter is not decisive. An example
would be Osborne and Slivinski’s (1996) and Besley and Coate’s (1997) citizen-candidate models.
We will not speculate on the possible implications of this extension here.
8A p p e n d i x
Proof. of Proposition 2. From (13), using q0(p)=q(p)/p and m = pv/, the interior
proportional tax equilibrium satisﬁes
u1 [b m(1  ),vq(p)] b m/v = u2 [b m(1  ),vq(p)]q(p) (20)
while the head tax satisﬁes, from (16),
u1
£




b m  pvt,vtq(p)
¤
q (p) (21)
Now,  b m/v < m/v = p. I.e., the eective unit price for the club good of quality q (p)
that is paid by the MV is less than the real price. Moreover, it follows that pv = m> b m
as m>b m by assumption. Suppose v = vt. Then, as pvt = pv >  b m,i tf o l l o w sb y
concavity and u12  0 that u2 [b m   b m,vq(p)]q(p) >u 2 [b m  pvt,vtq(p)]q (p).S o , w e
must have u1 [b m   b m,vq(p)] b m/v >u 1 [b m  pvt,vtq(p)]p.B u t ,w i t hvq(p)=vtq(p),
by hypothesis, and pvt >  b m, it follows by concavity that u1 [b m   b m,vq(p)] b m/v <
u1 [b m  pvt,vtq(p)]p. This is a contradiction. So, we cannot have v = vt. Suppose, next, vt >
v.T h e nvtq(p) >v q (p) and u2 [b m   b m,vq(p)]q(p) >u 2 [b m  pvt,vtq(p)]q (p) again,
by concavity and u12  0. So, from the F.O.C.s, we must have u1 [b m   b m,vq(p)] b m/v >
u1 [b m  pvt,vtq(p)]p.B u t ,u1 [b m   b m,vq(p)] b m/v <u 1 [b m  pvt,vtq(p)]p, again by
16concavity and u12  0. Hence there is again a contradiction. So, we must have v >v t.
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